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Aggregation-Based Datacenter Energy
Management in Wholesale Electricity Markets
Zhe Yu, Yuanxiong Guo, Miao Pan and Yanmin Gong
Abstract—In this paper, we study how datacenter energy cost can be effectively reduced in the wholesale electricity market via
cooperative power procurement. Intuitively, by aggregating workloads and renewables across a group of datacenters, the overall power
demand uncertainty of datacenters can be reduced, resulting in less chance of being penalized when participating in the wholesale
electricity market. We use cooperative game theory to model the cooperative electricity procurement process of datacenters as a
cooperative game, and show the cost saving benefits of aggregation. Then, a cost allocation scheme based on the marginal
contribution of each datacenter to the total expected cost is proposed to distribute the aggregation benefits among the participating
datacenters. Besides, we propose proportional cost allocation scheme to distribute the aggregation benefits among the participating
datacenters after realizations of power demand and market prices. Finally, numerical experiments based on real-world traces are
conducted to illustrate the benefits of aggregation compared to noncooperative power procurement.
Index Terms—Cooperative game, datacenter energy management, wholesale electricity market, cost allocation.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
W ITH the booming of Internet-based and cloud com-puting services in recent years, datacenters hosting
these services have become ubiquitous in every sector of our
economy, and their energy consumption has been skyrock-
eting. According to a report [1] by the Natural Resources
Defense Council, datacenters in the U.S. consumed about 91
billion kWh of electricity in 2013, representing 2% of total
U.S. electricity consumption and costing U.S. businesses $13
billion in annual electricity bills, and their total electricity
consumption is estimated to be 139 billion kWh in 2020.
Energy cost accounts for a significant fraction (about 42%)
of the datacenter operating expense [2], and this fraction
is growing at an alarming rate of 12% annually [3]. Con-
sequentially, reducing energy cost has become a critical
concern for datacenter operators.
In order to reduce the growing electricity bills of dat-
acenters, from the demand side, substantial efforts have
been made, ranging from hardware such as energy-efficient
servers, storage devices, and network switches, to software
such as virtualization and dynamic CPU speed scaling and
capacity provisioning, which have led to dramatic improve-
ments in the energy-efficiency of datacenters. On the other
hand, it is also important for datacenters to manage their
energy cost from the supply side. As large consumers, data-
centers typically have multiple options to procure electricity
to meet their power demand. For instance, a datacenter may
purchase power from a retailer such as a local utility com-
pany with a pre-specified rate by signing bilateral contracts
beforehand [4]. It may also operate by leveraging on-site
power generators and energy storage systems [5].
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Given the significant power consumption and deregu-
lation of electricity market, another promising opportunity
to reduce datacenter energy cost is emerging: datacenters
can directly participate in the wholesale electricity market to
meet their power demand. While it is typical for consumers
to buy electricity from local utility companies, some inde-
pendent system operators (ISOs), such as Electric Reliability
Council of Texas (ERCOT) [6] and California ISO [7], have
recently developed a market that allows consumers to pur-
chase electricity directly from power suppliers by actively
participating in the electricity market. Indeed, datacenter
operators like Google have been granted the authority to
trade in the wholesale electricity market for the purpose of
managing their own energy cost [8]. The key advantage for
datacenters to procure electricity from the wholesale electricity
market instead of a local utility company is that they can avoid
the insurance premiums, service charges, and mark-up included
by utilities in retail rates [9].
However, a major challenge for datacenters in procuring
power directly from the wholesale electricity market is the
uncertainty of market prices and their power demand. In
most regions of U.S., the wholesale electricity market for
electrical power is organized into a two-settlement structure:
the day-ahead forward market and the real-time balancing
market. The consumers need to make a commitment or bid
about their scheduled energy usage to the day-aheadmarket
at first, and then any deviations between the scheduled
and actual usage are settled in the real-time balancing mar-
ket and subject to financial penalties. Since the day-ahead
market is often closed several hours (e.g., 14 to 38 hours
in California ISO) ahead of the actual operating time, this
leaves datacenters vulnerable to high deviation penalties
due to their highly uncertain power demand. In addition,
market prices are uncertain and hard to predict as well
due to the dynamic nature of the market. Therefore, it is
imperative for datacenters to mitigate risks associated with
these sources of uncertainty in order to maximize the cost
2saving in procuring power from the wholesale electricity
market directly.
In this paper, we aim to address the above challenge and
optimize datacenter participation strategies in the wholesale
electricity market for minimizing energy cost and facili-
tating energy sustainability of datacenters. In particular,
consider a scenario where multiple independent datacenters
operated by different owners in the same region purchase
power directly in the two-settlement electricity market. Al-
though it is risky for datacenters to participate in the market
individually due to the uncertainty of their workload ar-
rivals and on-site renewable generation, this paper takes an
aggregation-based approach that transforms these indepen-
dent datacenters from isolated entities into coordinated ones
in the market. Our essential idea is to exploit the statistical
diversity of workloads and renewables across different dat-
acenters and incentivize them to bid collectively in the day-
ahead market. Intuitively, by aggregating workloads and
renewables from different datacenters, the uncertainty of
total power demand can be reduced, resulting in less chance
of being penalized for deviations in the real-time balancing
market and higher energy cost saving.
To incentivize aggregation and distribute aggregation
benefits among datacenters, we propose to use cooperative
game theory. Specifically, the problem can be formulated
into a cooperative game with transferrable cost. In this
game, the set of players is the set of datacenters who seek
to cooperate in reducing electricity cost. We first prove that
coalitional formation can reduce energy cost compared to
individual power procurement in the wholesale electricity
market. Then our cooperative game is shown to be balanced
and therefore has a nonempty core. Given that the two
existing cost allocation methods, the Shapley value and
nucleolus, are not applicable to our game, we design an
efficient cost allocation scheme that can guarantee mutual
benefits for all participating datacenters such that no one
has the incentive to break up from the coalition and thus
locate a cost allocation in the core.
Besides, we discuss how to allocate the cost to each
datacenter after realizations of power demand and market
prices. As the cost function of our cooperative game is
defined in expectation, there might be some days such that
the participating datacenters need to pay more compared
to the realized cost. Therefore, coalitional members may
choose to deviate from such coalition if overpayment keeps
occurring. Therefore, we propose a cost allocation method
based on the proportion of the realized cost on every day
to ensure that in the long run, the allocated realized cost on
average will approach the expected cost almost surely.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related
work is reviewed in Section 2. A brief overview of coop-
erative game theory is given in Section 3. In Section 4,
we describe the models for datacenter power and two-
settlement electricity market. In Section 5, we model the
datacenter aggregation process as a cooperative game and
quantify the benefits of aggregation. Then, the core of the
formulated game is shown to be nonempty, and an efficient
scheme is proposed to find a cost allocation belonging to
the core, and the sharing of realized cost is discussed in
Section 6. Simulation results based on real-world traces are
presented in Section 7. Finally, the conclusion is given in
Section 8.
2 RELATED WORK
In the past decade, multiple schemes have been proposed
to reduce the electricity bill of datacenters. From the de-
mand side, in terms of engineering approaches, energy-
efficient servers, storage devices and network switches and
advanced cooling have been designed to improve the en-
ergy efficiency. On the other hand, in terms of algorithmic
approaches, dynamic capacity provisioning [10], [11], [12]
is developed to reduce energy cost by dynamically turning
off surplus servers. Dynamic CPU speed scaling [13], [14],
[15] is shown to reduce the energy usage of datacenters
by dynamically adapting the processing speed of a server
to the current workload. Geographical load balancing [16],
[17], [18], [19] is developed to exploit the spatial diversity of
electricity prices to minimize the energy cost of geograph-
ically distributed datacenters by dynamically routing the
user requests to regions with lower energy prices. Different
from these works, in this paper we consider the case where
datacenters minimize the energy cost from the supply side
by participating in the wholesale electricity market.
From the supply side, datacenters can purchase electric-
ity from the retail market [20], [21] with a fixed electricity
price by signing bilateral contracts beforehand. They can
also participate in the wholesale electricity market [4], [22],
[23], [24] to exploit uncertainty of electricity prices and
workloads to minimize their energy cost. On-site renewable
power generators such as solar panels and/or wind turbines
can be utilized to reduce energy cost [25], [26]. Exploiting the
temporal diversity of electricity prices to reduce energy cost
by using energy storage systems or shifting delay-tolerant
workload to off-peak time periods has also been investi-
gated in [27], [28], [29]. These papers consider datacenters
with the same owner participating in different wholesale
electricity markets. However, in our paper we focus on
the scenario where datacenters managed by independent
owners within the same region jointly participate in the
wholesale electricity market. Therefore, we need to use
game-theoretic methods to model this multi-agent problem
instead of optimization approaches.
3 BACKGROUND: COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY
In this section, we will briefly introduce the fundamental
concepts of cooperative game theory including the defi-
nition for a cooperative game with transferable cost, the
solution concept (i.e., the core) of a cooperative game, two
types of cooperative games with nonempty core (i.e., the
convex games and balanced games), and widely-used cost
allocation methods (i.e., the Shapley value and nucleolus).
3.1 Cooperative Game with Transferable Cost
In general, a cooperative game is defined by a pair (N , c).
The first element is the set of players N := {1, 2, . . . , N},
indexed by i ∈ N . Players may form different coalitions
S ⊆ N to pay a collective cost. The grand coalition N is the
set of all players. Secondly, c : 2N → R is the cost function
that assigns a cost to each coalition S ⊆ N . Transferable cost
implies that the total cost represented by a real number can
3be divided in any manner among the coalitional members
[30].
3.2 Imputations and the Core
The cost function of a cooperative game is said to be
subadditive if it satisfies the following condition:
c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ), ∀S, T ⊆ N , S ∩ T = ∅. (1)
For such cooperative game, it is to the mutual benefit of the
players to form the grand coalition N , since by subadditiv-
ity the amount received, c(N ), is at least as small as the total
amount received by any disjoint set of coalitions they could
form. Next, we focus on how to split this amount among
participating players.
A cost allocation for the coalition S ⊆ N is a vector
pi ∈ RN whose entry pii is the cost dispatched to each player
i in the coalition S (pii = 0, i /∈ S). Further, a cost allocation
pi is said to be efficient if
∑
i∈N pii = c(N ), i.e., the total
amount received by the players should be equal to c(N ).
A cost allocation pi is said to be individually rational if pii ≤
c({i}), i.e., no player will be expected to receive more cost
than acting individually. A cost allocation pi for the grand
coalition is said to be an imputation if it is both efficient and
individually rational. In cooperative game theory [31], [32],
the set of imputations for the game (N , c) is defined as
I =
{
pi ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
pii = c(N ), pii ≤ c({i}), ∀i ∈ N
}
.
(2)
Next, we introduce the solution concept of a cooperative
game. The core for the game (N , c) is defined as
C =
{
pi ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
pii = c(N ),
∑
i∈S
pii ≤ c(S), ∀S ⊆ N
}
.
(3)
The core is a set of imputations such that no coalitions can
obtain a cost which is less than the sum of cost assigned by
forming the grand coalition. Obviously, if one can locate a
cost allocation vector that lies in the core, then the grand
coalition is optimal for the cooperative game.
3.3 Convex and Balanced Games
The core is always well-defined, but can be empty. However,
the convex games and balanced games are two types of co-
operative games which guarantee the existence of nonempty
core [33], [34]. A cooperative game is said to be convex if the
cost function satisfies the following condition:
c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ) + c(S ∩ T ), ∀S, T ⊆ N . (4)
This implies the cooperative game has a submodular cost
function.
A map ρ : 2N → [0, 1] is said to be balanced if for all
i ∈ N , ∑
S∈2N
ρ(S)1{i ∈ S} = 1, (5)
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function. Thus, the bal-
anced map indicates that the sum of weights ρ(S) assigned
for each coalition including player i will be equal to 1. Then
a cooperative game is said to be balanced if and only if for
any balanced map ρ,∑
S∈2N
ρ(S)c(S) ≥ c(N ). (6)
3.4 Shapley Value
The Shapley value [35] as the cost allocation method is a
unique mapping ψ that satisfies a series of characteristic
axioms such as efficiency, symmetry, dummy and additivity.
For a cooperative game (N , c) with transferable cost, the
Shapley value ψi(c) that distributes the cost for each player
i ∈ N is defined as
ψi(c) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(N − |S| − 1)!
N !
[c(S ∪ {i})− c(S)] .
(7)
We observe that in (7), the marginal contribution of each
player is represented as c(S ∪ {i}) − c(S) and the coeffi-
cient ahead of the marginal distribution is the probability
that the player i randomly joins the coalition S. Thus, the
Shapley value can be interpreted as the expected marginal
contribution of player i in the grand coalition N when it
joins the coalition S in a random order. It is guaranteed that
the Shapley value lies in the core if the game is convex [33].
3.5 Nucleolus
The nucleolus [36] is another common cost allocation
method. It uniquely exists in a cooperative game and sat-
isfies the efficiency, individually rational, symmetry and
dummy properties [30]. Different from axiomatically de-
signing the cost allocation scheme to ensure fairness as
in the Shapley value, the nucleolus aims at minimizing
the dissatisfaction of the players. The dissatisfaction of a
coalition S given an imputationpi is measured by the excess.
The definition of excess is given by
e(pi, S) =
∑
i∈S
pii − c(S). (8)
Since the core is defined as the set of imputations such that∑
i∈S pii ≤ c(S) for all coalitions S ⊆ N , it follows that an
imputation pi is in the core if and only if all its excesses
are negative or zero [37]. In order to find the nucleolus,
we first need to locate an imputation that minimizes the
maximum of the excesses e(pi, S) over all coalitions S by
solving a linear program. After this is done, one may have
to solve a second linear programming problem to minimize
the next largest excess, and so on. Therefore, in the worst-
case, O(2N ) linear programs need to be solved, which is
computationally expensive [38].
4 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we start by introducing the datacenter power
model and characterizing the uncertainty of net power
demand for each datacenter. Then, the two-settlement elec-
tricity market is described and the expected electricity cost
for each datacenter when participating in the market indi-
vidually is derived.
Consider a set N := {1, 2, . . . , N} of independent dat-
acenters participating in the same electricity market for
4(a) Individual Bidding
(b) Cooperative Bidding
Fig. 1. Individual bidding and cooperative bidding in the wholesale
electricity market.
power procurement. For instance, SoftLayer, Google, Mi-
crosoft and Amazon have all built large-scale datacenters in
San Francisco Bay Area, and these datacenters are served
by California ISO for wholesale power procurement. We
assume each datacenter is equipped with renewable power
generators such as solar panels and/or wind turbines. As
shown in Fig. 1(a), each datecenter can bid its power de-
mand in the wholesale electricity market, and then pay
its electricity bill individually. Note that datacenters can
bid negative amount to supply power in the wholesale
electricity market. As shown in Fig. 1(b), we explore the
scenario in which individual datacenters form a coalition
to collectively bid their aggregated power demand in the
wholesale electricity market as a single entity for cost sav-
ing. Without loss of generality, in the following of the paper
we restrict our analysis to a specific operating hour.
4.1 Datacenter Power Model
Assume each datacenter i ∈ N hasMi homogenous servers
whose idle and peak power consumption are P idlei and
P
peak
i , respectively
1. Users submit their requests (e.g., search
queries) to datacenters, and datacenters process these re-
quests to satisfy the quality-of-service (QoS) requirement
as indicated by the service-level agreement (SLA). When
1. Note that a datacenter with heterogenous servers can be also
viewed as several datacenters, each having homogeneous servers.
Therefore, we focus on the homogenous case in this paper.
datacenter i keeps mi active servers to process the arriving
user requests, its IT power consumption can be estimated as
[39]
Pi = mi
[
P idlei + ui(P
peak
i − P
idle
i )
]
, (9)
where ui is the average CPU utilization level across all
servers at datacenter i.
We adopt a M/GI/1 Processor Sharing (PS) queue to
model the service process at each server [16]. The workload
arrival rate at each datacenter i, measured in terms of the
average number of arriving user requests per unit time, is
assumed to be λi, where λi ∈ [λmini , λ
max
i ], and λ
min
i and
λmaxi denotes the minimum andmaximumworkload arrival
rates at each datacenter i, respectively. Let µi denote the
service rate at which user requests are processed by a server
at datacenter i. Then the average CPU utilization level in
datacenter i is calculated as ui = λi/(miµi). Therefore, the
power consumption model (9) can be rewritten as
Pi = miP
idle
i +
λi
µi
(
P
peak
i − P
idle
i
)
. (10)
Since each user request has a QoS requirement, data-
centers need to turn on enough servers to meet that re-
quirement. Here we use the average response time as the
QoS metric. Based on the M/GI/1/PS queuing model, the
average response time of user requests given mi active
servers in datacenter i is represented as
Ti =
1
µi − λi/mi
. (11)
Let Tmaxi denote the maximum average response time of
user requests that can be tolerated at datacenter i. Then to
ensure that Ti ≤ T
max
i , we obtain the following feasible
range for the number of active servers at datacenter i:
λi
µi − 1/Tmaxi
≤ mi ≤Mi. (12)
Here, we relax the constraint that requires mi to be integer
given the fact that datacenters usually contain thousands
of servers. It is assumed that each datacenter turn on the
minimal number of active servers without violating their
QoS requirement using the dynamic capacity provisioning
technique [12], [40]. Therefore the IT power consumption of
each datacenter i is
Pi =
λi
µi − 1/Tmaxi
P idlei +
λi
µi
(
P
peak
i − P
idle
i
)
. (13)
In order to incorporate the non-IT (e.g. cooling, lighting)
power consumption of datacenters, we denote the average
power usage effectiveness (PUE) as γi, which is defined as
the ratio of the total power consumption to the IT power
consumption at datacenter i. It follows that the total power
consumption Ei of datacenter i is given by
Ei = θiλi, (14)
where θi is a constant defined as
θi := γi
(
P idlei
µi − 1/Tmaxi
+
P
peak
i − P
idle
i
µi
)
. (15)
We have Ei ∈ [Emini , E
max
i ], where E
min
i and E
max
i denotes
the minimum and maximum power consumption at data-
center i, respectively, which depends on the minimum and
5maximum workload arrival rates λmini and λ
max
i , respec-
tively.
Besides, we assume datacenters are equipped with re-
newable power generators such as solar panels and/or wind
turbines, and the renewable power generation is denoted
as Ri for each datacenter i, where 0 ≤ Ri ≤ Rmaxi ,
and Rmaxi is the installed capacity of the renewable power
generators at datacenter i. Then, the net power demand for
each datacenter i is given by
Di = Ei −Ri = θiλi −Ri. (16)
We have Di ∈ [Dmini , D
max
i ], where D
min
i and D
max
i denote
the minimum and maximum net power demand at datacen-
ter i, respectively. It follows that Dmini = E
min
i − R
max
i and
Dmaxi = E
max
i .
When datacenter i bids in the day-ahead market one
day ahead, the workload arrivals and on-site renewable
generation for the next day are uncertain, and thus the
workload arrival rate λi and renewable power generation
Ri can be modeled as random variables whose probability
distribution can be empirically estimated from historical
data. It follows that the datacenter net power demand
Di(λi, Ri) as a function of the workload arrival rate λi
and the renewable power generation Ri is also a random
variable.
4.2 Two-Settlement Electricity Market
Consider a wholesale electricity market managed by an ISO
with a two-settlement structure in the region through which
the datacenters consume or sell power. It consists of a day-
ahead forward market and a real-time balancing market.
In the day-ahead forward market, participants bid and
schedule power transactions for each hour of the following
day before the gate closure. After that, the ISO clears the
market and calculates the day-ahead market clearing price
for each hour as the intersection between the aggregate
supply and demand curves. For instance, for California ISO,
the day-ahead forward market closes for bids and schedules
by 10 AM and clears by 1 PM on the day prior to the op-
erating day. The schedules cleared in the day-ahead market
are financially binding. Any deviations between the day-
ahead committed schedule and actual power consumption
or supply will be settled in the real-time balancing market
during the operating day. If the actual consumption is more
than or generation is less than the committed schedule, the
energy shortfall will be purchased in the balancing market
at the negative imbalance price, which is usually higher than
the day-ahead price. If the actual consumption is less than or
generation is more than the committed schedule, the energy
surplus will be sold at the positive imbalance price, which
is usually lower than the day-ahead price. Therefore, power
deviations from day-ahead commitments normally result in
penalties for participants.
Specifically, for the considered wholesale electricity mar-
ket, let pd ∈ R+ be the market clearing price in the day-
ahead forward market, p− ∈ R+ be the negative imbalance
price for energy shortfall, and p+ ∈ R+ be the positive
imbalance price for energy surplus. The datacenters are as-
sumed to be price-taking because their energy consumption
or supply are often too small to influence the market. The
market prices (pd, p−, p+) are not known to the datacenters
at the time of bidding in the day-ahead market and there-
fore modeled as random variables with known expected
values denoted by µdp, µ
−
p , and µ
+
p , respectively, which
can be estimated empirically from historical market data.
As explained before, without loss of generality, we assume
µ+p ≤ µ
d
p ≤ µ
−
p . Moreover, the market prices (p
d, p−, p+)
are assumed to be statistically independent of the workload
arrival rates and renewable power generation (λi, Ri, ∀i).
Suppose that each datacenter i ∈ N bids a power
consumption or supply amountQi in the day-aheadmarket.
Note that in our problem formulation, we focus on a specific
operating hour. With the above models and assumptions, it
follows that the expected cost of datacenter i from partici-
pating in the market individually can be calculated as
Φi = µ
d
pQi + µ
−
p E[(Di −Qi)
+]− µ+p E[(Qi −Di)
+], (17)
where (x)+ := max(x, 0). Note that there are two cases for
datacenter i in the market in (17):
• Datacenter i behaves as a consumer, i.e., Qi ≥ 0.
µdpQi denotes the day-ahead trading cost, µ
−
p E[(Di−
Qi)
+] denotes the demand shortfall penalty, and
µ+p E[(Qi−Di)
+] denotes the demand surplus profit.
• Datacenter i behaves as a producer, i.e.,Qi < 0. µ
d
pQi
denotes the day-ahead trading profit, µ−p E[(Di −
Qi)
+] denotes the supply shortfall penalty, and
µ+p E[(Qi −Di)
+] denotes the supply surplus profit.
Note that if Φi < 0, then |Φi| represents the expected profit
for datacenter i when it bids in the market individually.
5 COALITIONAL DATACENTER BIDDING
In this section, we start by introducing the datacenter ag-
gregation model where multiple datacenters can form a
coalition to bid in the day-ahead market collectively as
shown in Fig. 1(b). Then, it can be verified that by bidding
net power demand aggregately in the day-aheadmarket, the
total electricity bill can be effectively reduced based on the
fact that datacenter aggregation can reduce the uncertainty
of the total workload arrivals, renewable generation and
associated net power demand.
5.1 Datacenter Aggregation as a Cooperative Game
Datacenters can form different coalitions and bid collec-
tively in the day-ahead market. Any coalition S ⊆ N
represents an agreement among the datacenters in S to act
as a single entity in the market. The aggregated datacenter
net power demand of a coalition S ⊆ N is specified by
DS =
∑
i∈S
Di. (18)
Further, we denote the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of DS as
FS(e) = Pr(DS ≤ e). (19)
The corresponding quantile function is given by
F−1S (ε) = inf {e ∈ [D
min
S , D
max
S ] : ε ≤ FS(e)}, (20)
6where DminS and D
max
S are the minimum and maximum
aggregated net power demand for coalition S. Given the
minimum and maximum aggregated power consumption
and maximum aggregated renewable generation for coali-
tion S denoted as EminS , E
max
S and R
max
S , respectively, it
follows that DminS = E
min
S −R
max
S and D
max
S = E
max
S .
Next, we use cooperative game theory [41] to model
this cooperation process as a cooperative game (N , c) with
transferable cost since it is under a multi-agent scenario
where each datacenter tends to minimize its own net cost.
Note that minimizing the negative cost is equivalent to
maximize the profit. In our model, the set of datacenters N
is the set of players in the cooperative game. Moreover, we
assume each datacenter always seeks to minimize its own
electricity cost, and then the cost function c(S) associated
with every coalition S ⊆ N is represented as its minimum
expected energy cost calculated as
ΦS = µ
d
pQS+µ
−
p E[(DS−QS)
+]−µ+p E[(QS−DS)
+], (21)
c(S) = min
QS∈[DminS ,D
max
S
]
ΦS , (22)
where QS is the bidding amount of any coalition S in the
day-ahead market. We assume the market prices for the
coalitional bid is the same as that of individual bids. This
assumption is acceptable since the datacenters are assumed
to be relatively small compared to all other prosumers par-
ticipating in the electricity market so that their operations
have little impact on the cleared prices of the day-head
market or real-time market [42]. Solving (22) as a news-
vendor problem [43], [44], the optimal day-ahead bid and
expected cost are given in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The optimal day-ahead bid of any coalition S is given
by
Q∗S = F
−1
S (ε
∗), where ε∗ =
µ−p − µ
d
p
µ−p − µ
+
p
. (23)
The optimal expected cost is given by
c(S) = µ+p
∫ ε∗
0
F−1S (θ) dθ + µ
−
p
∫ 1
ε∗
F−1S (θ) dθ. (24)
Proof: We first rewrite (22) as below:
c(S) = min
QS
µdpQS + µ
−
p
∫ DmaxS
QS
(u−QS)fS(u) du
− µ+p
∫ QS
Dmin
S
(QS − u)fS(u) du, (25)
where fS(·) is the corresponding probability density func-
tion (PDF) of the CDF as defined in (19). Then by applying
the first order optimality condition associated with Leibniz
integral rule, we have
µdp − µ
−
p (1− FS(QS))− µ
+
p FS(QS) = 0, (26)
Q∗S = F
−1
S (ε
∗), where ε∗ =
µ−p − µ
d
p
µ−p − µ
+
p
. (27)
Optimal expected cost is given by direct substitution of Q∗S
into (25):
c(S) = µdpQ
∗
S + µ
−
p
∫ DmaxS
Q∗
S
(u−Q∗S)fS(u) du
− µ+p
∫ Q∗S
Dmin
S
(Q∗S − u)fS(u) du
= µdpQ
∗
S + µ
−
p
∫ 1
ε∗
(F−1S (θ) −Q
∗
S) dθ
− µ+p
∫ ε∗
0
(Q∗S − F
−1
S (θ)) dθ
= Q∗S (µ
d
p − µ
−
p + ε
∗(µ−p − µ
+
p ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ µ+p
∫ ε∗
0
F−1S (θ) dθ + µ
−
p
∫ 1
ε∗
F−1S (θ) dθ. (28)
5.2 The Benefits of Aggregation
Intuitively, no group of datacenters can do worse by joining
a coalition than by acting noncooperatively since aggre-
gation can reduce uncertainty. We will prove this by the
following theorem:
Theorem 2. Given an arbitrary coalition S ⊆ N , let
{Q1, Q2, . . . , Q|S|} be a set of |S| individual day-ahead bids.
For QS =
∑
i∈S Qi we have:
ΦS(QS) ≤
∑
i∈S
Φi(Qi). (29)
Proof: We introduce an ancillary random variable Xi
and rewrite (21) in terms of Xi as follows:
Xi := Di −Qi, (30)
ΦS(QS) = µ
d
pQS + µ
−
p E
[(∑
i∈S
Xi
)+]
− µ+p E
[(
−
∑
i∈S
Xi
)+]
, (31)
∑
i∈S
Φi(Qi) = µ
d
p
∑
i∈S
Qi + µ
−
p E
[∑
i∈S
(
Xi
)+]
− µ+p E
[∑
i∈S
(
−Xi
)+]
. (32)
By adopting the equivalent forms of (x)+:
(x)+ := max(x, 0) :=
x+ |x|
2
, (33)
(31)−(32) =
µ−p E
[∑
i∈S Xi +
∣∣∑
i∈S Xi
∣∣
2
−
∑
i∈S
Xi + |Xi|
2
]
− µ+p E
[∣∣∑
i∈S Xi
∣∣−∑i∈S Xi
2
−
∑
i∈S
|Xi| −Xi
2
]
=
(
µ−p − µ
+
p
2
)
E
[(∣∣∑
i∈S
Xi
∣∣−∑
i∈S
|Xi|
)]
≤ 0. (34)
7The above inequality holds according to the triangle in-
equality, i.e.,
∣∣∑
i∈S Xi
∣∣ ≤ ∑i∈S |Xi| and also by assump-
tion, we have µ−p ≥ µ
+
p . Therefore, ΦS(QS) ≤
∑
i∈S Φi(Qi).
It is straightforward to see that the expected cost by par-
ticipating in the market collectively is less than the sum of
that by participating in the market individually. That is, the
datacenters save the expected cost of
∑
i∈S Φi(Qi)−ΦS(QS)
collectively via aggregation. Further, we establish some
properties of the cost function associated with every coali-
tion.
Lemma 1. The optimal expected cost c(S) of any coalition S has
following properties:
1) Positive homogeneity: For any scalar β ≥ 0, c(βS) =
βc(S).
2) Subadditivity: For any two disjoint coalitions S1 and S2,
if coalition S1 ∪ S2 forms, then c(S1 ∪ S2) ≤ c(S1) +
c(S2).
Proof: First we prove the positive homogeneity. The
CDF of the positively scaled DS is denoted as
FβS(u) = Pr(βDS ≤ u) = FβS
(
u
β
)
.
It follows that the quantile function of FβS(u) is given by
F−1βS (ε
∗) = βF−1S (ε
∗).
Using the results from Theorem 1, we can prove the positive
homogeneity as
c(βS) = µ+p
∫ ε∗
0
F−1βS (θ) dθ + µ
−
p
∫ 1
ε∗
F−1βS (θ) dθ
= β
(
µ+p
∫ ε∗
0
F−1S (θ) dθ + µ
−
p
∫ 1
ε∗
F−1S (θ) dθ
)
= βc(S). (35)
Next we prove the subadditivity as
c(S1) + c(S2) = min
QS1
ΦS1(QS1) + min
QS2
ΦS2(QS2)
= ΦS1(Q
∗
S1
) + ΦS2(Q
∗
S2
), (36)
where Q∗S1 and Q
∗
S2
are the optimal day-ahead bids of
their respective minimization problems. It follows from
Theorem 2 that
ΦS1(Q
∗
S1
) + ΦS2(Q
∗
S2
) ≥ ΦS1∪S2(Q
∗
S1
+Q∗S2)
≥ ΦS1∪S2(Q
∗
S1∪S2)
= c(S1 ∪ S2), (37)
where Q∗S1∪S2 is the optimal solution of the expected cost
minimization problem under coalition S1 ∪S2, while Q∗S1 +
Q∗S1 is a feasible solution of the minimization problem, then
it follows that c(S1 ∪ S2) ≤ c(S1) + c(S2).
From positive homogeneity, we observe that when the
aggregated net power demand is scaled, the corresponding
value of the optimal expected cost will also be scaled in the
same proportion. From subadditivity, we observe that for
rational datacenters who always try to minimize their cost,
they will form a large-size coalition to benefit more from the
aggregation. It is straightforward to see in our game that all
the datacenters will form the grand coalition N in order to
minimize their total expected cost.
6 COST ALLOCATION MECHANISM
In the section, we focus on how to find a cost allocation
vector pi as defined in Section 3.2 to split the total expected
cost to each datacenter in the grand coalition. First, we verify
that our game is nonconvex, and hence the Shapley value is
not applicable to locate the core of our game. Next, we show
that the core of our cooperative game exists and is nonempty
by proving it is a balanced game. Moreover, we propose a
cost allocation scheme based on the marginal contribution of
each datacenter to the total cost in the grand coalition. Last,
we discuss how to allocate the cost to each participating
datacenters after the realizations of net power demand and
market prices.
6.1 Existence of the Nonempty Core
As shown in Section 3, both the convexity and balanced-
ness can guarantee the core of a cooperative game to be
nonempty. First, we show that our cooperative bidding
game is nonconvex by the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Our cooperative bidding game is nonconvex.
Proof: We consider a cooperative bidding game in-
volving three datacenters, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and de-
note their net power demand asA1,A2 andA3, respectively.
We assume the marginal distribution ofA1 andA2 are given
by
Ai =
{
2, w.p. 0.5
4, w.p. 0.5
∀i = 1, 2.
Further, assume A3 is perfectly positively correlated to A2,
i.e., A3 = A2. We set the expected day-ahead, negative im-
balance and positive imbalance prices as µdp = 0.9, µ
−
p = 1.4
and µ+p = 0.4, respectively. Then based on Theorem 1, we
have:
ε∗ =
1.4− 0.9
1.4− 0.4
= 0.5,
c({1}) = c({2}) = c({3}) = 3.2,
c({1, 2}) = c({1, 3}) = 5.9,
c({2, 3}) = 6.4,
c({1, 2, 3}) = 9.1.
Here, we choose two coalitions as S = {1, 2} and T =
{1, 3}, and then from the above example, we have:
c({1, 2}) + c({1, 3}) = 10.8 < c({1, 2, 3}) + c({1}) = 12.3,
which violates the definition of convex game given in (4).
Therefore, our cooperative game is nonconvex.
Since the convexity of a cooperative game is a stronger
condition compared to the balancedness, we prove the exis-
tence of the core in terms of balancedness by the following
theorem:
Theorem 4. The cooperative game (N , c) for datacenter aggrega-
8Proof: Given an arbitrary balanced map ρ : 2N →
[0, 1], by following the concept of the balanced game, we
have∑
S∈2N
ρ(S)c(S) =
∑
S∈2N
c(ρ(S)S) (38)
≥ c

 ∑
S∈2N
ρ(S)S

 (39)
= c

 ∑
S∈2N
ρ(S)
(⋃
i∈N
1{i ∈ S}i
)
= c

⋃
i∈N

 ∑
S∈2N
ρ(S)1{i ∈ S}

 i

 (40)
= c
(⋃
i∈N
i
)
= c(N ),
where (38) is because of the positive homogeneity of c(S),
(39) is because of the subadditivity of c(S), and (40) is
derived by the definition of balanced map ρ. Therefore, the
cooperative game (N , c) is balanced and has a nonempty
core.
6.2 Marginal Cost Allocation
Two prominent cost allocation schemes are described in
Section 3. However, both of them are not applicable to solve
our cooperative game. The Shapley value can be guaranteed
to lie in the core if the cooperative game is convex. However,
as shown through a counterexample in Theorem 3, our
game is not convex. Therefore, the Shapley value does not
necessarily belong to the core and hence is not applicable
to allocate cost in our game. The nucleolus uniquely exists
and can be used as a cost allocation scheme in our game.
However, as mentioned before, in the worst-case scenario,
O(2N ) linear programs need to be solved in order to get the
cost allocation vector, which is computationally expensive.
Here, we propose a cost allocation scheme based on
the marginal contribution of each datacenter to the total
expected cost when participating in the grand coalition and
prove the resulting cost allocation vector is in the core.
We define an aggregation level vector α = [α1, . . . , αN ]
T ,
where each element 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 represents the fraction
of datacenter net power demand Di that participates in
the aggregative power procurement. Thus, the weighted
net power demand of the aggregation with the aggregation
level vector α is denoted as
Dα,N =
N∑
i=1
αiDi, (41)
whose quantile function is represented by F−1
α,N (ε) and
defined similar to (20). Then by applying Theorem 1, we
can obtain the optimal expected cost of the weighted net
power demand as
cα(N ) = µ
+
p
∫ ε∗
0
F−1
α,N (θ) dθ + µ
−
p
∫ 1
ε∗
F−1
α,N (θ) dθ. (42)
The positive homogeneity and subadditivity proved in
Lemma 1 can be easily extended to the case where we con-
sider the weighted optimal expected cost cα(N ). Further,
we show another property as follows:
Lemma 2. The weighted optimal expected cost cα(N ) of any
coalition S is nonincreasing over α, i.e., for any two aggregation
level vectors, if α  α′2, then cα(N ) ≤ cα′(N ).
Proof: Given two aggregation level vectors α and α′
where α  α′, then for any element in the vector α − α′,
we have 0 ≤ αi − α
′
i ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N . Using the subadditivity
property, we have
cα(N ) ≤ cα′(N ) + cα−α′(N ), (43)
which indicates the nonincreasing property.
According to Lemma 2, the optimal expected cost will be
achieved when α = 1, where 1 ∈ RN×1 is an all-one vector.
Then it follows that cα(N )|α=1 = c(N ).
To distribute the total expected cost c(N ) among the
datacenters in the grand coalition, we compute the expected
cost for each datacenter i as
pii =
∂cα(N )
∂αi
∣∣∣
α=1
, ∀i ∈ N . (44)
Indeed, pii can be decomposed as the multiplication of two
terms:
pii =
∂cα(N )
∂Dα,N
∣∣∣
α=1
×
∂Dα,N
∂αi
∣∣∣
α=1
, ∀i ∈ N , (45)
where the second term is exactly the net power demand
Di of each datacenter. On the other hand, the first term is
the partial derivative of the weighted optimal expected cost
with respect to the weighted net power demand and then
evaluating at the full aggregation level, i.e., α = 1, which
can be considered as the marginal cost assigned to each
datacenter. Therefore, the multiplication of the marginal cost
and net power demand gives the distributed cost to each
datacenter. Further, we prove that the cost allocation vector
pi = [pi1, . . . , piN ]
T given in (44) lies in the core as shown in
following theorem:
Theorem 5. The resulting cost allocation vector of the proposed
cost allocation scheme is fair and lies in the core of our cooperative
game.
Proof: Our proof is similar to [45], [46] which focus on
different aggregation problems. Here we only give a sketch
of the proof process. The basic idea is that we could also
use the non-cooperative game theory to model the same
problem by allowing power exchange within datacenters
as well, and our proposed allocation method can find the
Nash equilibrium of the formulated noncooperative game.
Since the core of our cooperative game can be shown to
be the same as the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding
noncooperative game, our proposed cost allocation scheme
is guaranteed to find the core of the cooperative game.
Details about the proof process can be found in [45], [46].
The most significant advantage of exploiting this method
is its low computational complexity. Compared to using the
nucleolus, we only need to calculate O(N) equations.
2. The operator  represents component-wise vector comparison.
96.3 Realized Cost Allocation
Since the cost function (22) of our cooperative bidding
game is defined in terms of optimal expected cost, any cost
allocation vector lying in the core represents the average
cost each participating datacenter should pay. However,
the realized cost will vary day to day due to the inherent
uncertainty of net power demand and market prices. There
might be some days such that the participating datacenters
need to pay more by using our proposed cost allocation
method than the realized cost. If overpayment keeps oc-
curring, the coalitional datacenters may choose to deviate
from the grand coalition, which will break the stability of
our game. Therefore, it is necessary to design a way to
allocate the realized cost such that the payment to coalition
members, averaged over the participating days, approaches
the allocated cost in expectation.
Assume the set of operating days {1, 2, . . . ,K} is in-
dexed by k. After realizations of net power demand of
datacenters and market prices at a particular hour on day k,
we letDkS and (p
d
k, p
−
k , p
+
k ) denote the aggregated net power
demand for coalition S and market prices, respectively.
Further, we assume DkS and (p
d
k, p
−
k , p
+
k ) are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over operating days. Then
according to (21), we can calculate the realized cost for any
coalition S ⊆ N as
ΦkS = p
d
kQ
∗
S + p
−
k (D
k
S −Q
∗
S)
+ − p+k (Q
∗
S −D
k
S)
+, (46)
where the optimal day-ahead bidQ∗S is given by Theorem 1.
Then, we denote the realized cost allocation vector at a
particular hour on day k as ξk = [ξk1 , . . . , ξ
k
N ]
T where each
entry ξki ∈ R is the realized cost dispatched to datacenter i
at a particular hour on day k. Given the realization of cost
ΦkN for grand coalition N at a particular hour on day k
and the cost allocation vector pi∗ by using our marginal cost
allocation method, we propose a proportional allocation to
distribute the realized cost to each participating datacenter
as follows:
ξki =
pi∗i∑N
j=1 pi
∗
j
ΦkN , ∀i ∈ N . (47)
The above proportional cost allocation method satisfies
the following two properties:
• Realized efficiency:
∑N
i=1 ξ
k
i = Φ
k
N . The total re-
alized cost at a particular hour on day k paid by
all the players should be equal to ΦkN . Our pro-
posed method satisfies the realized efficiency since∑N
i=1 ξ
k
i =
∑N
i=1 pi
∗
i∑
N
j=1 pi
∗
j
ΦkN = Φ
k
N .
• Consistency: 1
K
∑K
k=1 ξ
k
i
a.s.
−−→ pi∗i . For player i, the
realized cost allocation ξki at a particular hour av-
eraged over K operating days will approach the ex-
pected cost allocation pi∗i almost surely. Our proposed
method satisfies the consistency due to the strong
law of large numbers since the average of the results
obtained from a large number of trials should be
close to the expected value.
Due to the above two properties, our proposed proportional
cost allocation method can ensure that in the long run,
the average of the realized cost allocation will approach
the expected cost allocation, which can prevent datacenters
from leaving the coalition.
TABLE 1
Simulation Parameters
Mi µi (requests/s) Tmaxi (ms)
Datacenter 1 5000 200 100
Datacenter 2 7500 250 80
Datacenter 3 10000 300 60
Datacenter 4 12500 350 40
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Fig. 2. CDFs of the normalized datacenter workload arrival rates and
power consumption at hour 5.
7 NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first introduce our simulation setup and
then conduct trace-driven simulations to show the benefits
of datacenter aggregation in trading power in the wholesale
electricity market and the effectiveness of our proposed cost
allocation scheme.
7.1 Simulation Setup
In this following sections, we will introduce the simulation
setup for datacenters, workloads, renewable energy and
electricity prices, respectively. All our simulations are con-
ducted on a desktop computer with an Intel Core i7-4790
3.60GHz CPU and 8GB RAM using MATLAB R2016a.
7.1.1 Datacenter Descriptions
A set of four independent datacenters N = {1, 2, 3, 4} is
considered in our simulations. The total number of servers
for each datacenter is 5,000, 7,500, 10,000 and 12,500, re-
spectively. Assume the idle power and peak power of each
server is 150 W and 250W, respectively. Besides, the average
PUEs of all the datacenters are set to 1.5. The average service
rate of a server in each datacenter is set to be 200, 250, 300
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Fig. 3. Normalized wind turbine power curve.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Nomalized Wind Power
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Datacenter 1
Datacenter 2
Datacenter 3
Datacenter 4
Fig. 4. CDFs of the normalized wind power generation at hour 5.
and 350 requests per second, respectively. The maximum
average response time for each datacenter is set to be 100, 80,
60 and 40ms, respectively. The above simulation parameters
are summarized in Table 1.
7.1.2 Workload Descriptions
The real-world dataset we use to simulate the workloads
is from the Google cluster trace [47]. The selected dataset
includes workload information over 29 days (i.e., 696 hours)
during May 2011 for a cluster of 12,500 severs. We repeat
the original data and extend it to 1008-hour workloads
(i.e., 42 days). Then, we randomly choose 4 different 720-
hour (i.e., 30 days) portions from the extended dataset as
our datacenter workloads. Fig. 2(a) shows the CDFs of
the normalized datacenter workload arrival rates for four
datacenters at hour 5. Then we can estimate the power
consumption of each datacenter according to (14). The CDFs
of the power consumption for four datacenters at hour 5 are
depicted in Fig. 2(b).
7.1.3 Renewable Energy Descriptions
We consider each datacenter is equipped with on-site wind
turbines. The real-world dataset we use to simulate the
wind power generation is from the NREL National Wind
Technology Center (M2) [48]. We select the dataset for wind
speed at 80 meters from January 2016 to June 2016, and then
estimate the corresponding wind power output as shown
in Fig. 3, where the cut-in speed, rated output speed and
cut-out speed are set to 3.5 m/s, 14 m/s and 25 m/s,
respectively. After that, we randomly choose 4 different 720-
hour (i.e., 30 days) portions from the converted wind power
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Fig. 5. CDFs of the datacenter net power demand at hour 5.
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Fig. 6. Day-ahead bidding level comparison over 24 hours.
output data (6 months) as our datacenter renewable power
generation. The CDFs of the normalized wind power output
for four datacenters at hour 5 are shown in Fig. 4. Then
according to (16), we can obtain the CDFs of net power
demand for four datacenters at hour 5 which is shown in
Fig. 5.
7.1.4 Electricity Price Descriptions
In our simulations, datacenters can trade power either in-
dividually or cooperatively by forming the grand coalition.
Moreover, we assume datacenters bid their net power de-
mand in the day-ahead market for each hour in the follow-
ing operating day. By default, the expected day-ahead price
µdp is set to be 5 cents/kWh, the expected negative imbalance
price µ−p is set to be 5.83 cents/kWh, and the expected
positive imbalance price µ+p is set to be 2.5 cents/kWh in
the simulations.
7.2 Experimental Results
In this section, we simulate and analyze how datacen-
ters can benefit from forming the grand coalition to save
their electricity cost when trading power in the wholesale
electricity market. Here, we consider the case where each
datacenter bids its net power demand individually by min-
imizing its expected energy cost as the baseline scenario for
comparison.
7.2.1 Benefits of Aggregation
We first observe the benefits of coalitional bidding in the
wholesale electricity market. Based on Theorem 1, we can
calculate the optimal day-ahead bid Q∗S of any coalition S.
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Fig. 7. Total expected cost comparison over 24 hours.
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Fig. 8. Cost allocation of each datacenter at hour 5 under the current
setting.
Fig. 6 shows the resulting optimal day-ahead bidding level
of our proposed method and the sum of optimal individual
bidding level in the baseline over 24 hours. It can be ob-
served that the day-ahead bidding level at several hours are
negative under baseline scenario, which means at least one
datacenter behaves as producer by bidding negative power
amount in the day-ahead market. Fig. 7 shows the energy
cost comparison of our proposed approach and the baseline.
The result of the baseline scenario is obtained by adding
up the optimal expected electricity cost of each datacenter
when they bid in the day-ahead market individually, while
the result of the proposed method is obtained by letting
datacenters form the grand coalition to bid in the day-ahead
market cooperatively. It is shown in Fig. 7 that the total
electricity cost is effectively reduced by cooperative day-
ahead bidding, which validates the subadditivity property
of our cooperative game given in Lemma 1. The average
hourly cost saving is around 18.03% under the current
setting.
7.2.2 Cost Allocation
Next we focus on how to distribute the total energy cost af-
ter coalitional bidding among each participating datacenter
using our proposed cost allocation method.We split the total
expected cost based on the marginal contribution of each
datacenter in the grand coalition by applying the proposed
cost allocation scheme in Section 6.2. Fig. 8 presents the cost
allocation to each datacenter at hour 5. The height of blue
bar and yellow bar denote the individual bidding cost and
allocated cost of each datacenter after coalitional bidding
in the day-ahead market, respectively. It can be observed
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Fig. 9. Individual cost saving percentage of each datacenter after coali-
tional day-ahead bidding over 24 hours.
TABLE 2
Cost comparison for all coalitions of four datacenters at hour 5
S c(S)
∑
i∈S
pii
∑
i∈S
pii − c(S)
1 {1} 177.18 161.21 −15.97
2 {2} −6.24 −30.72 −24.48
3 {3} 176.09 128.99 −47.10
4 {4} 104.21 80.94 −23.27
5 {1, 2} 138.24 130.49 −7.75
6 {1, 3} 321.56 290.20 −31.36
7 {1, 4} 263.08 242.15 −20.93
8 {2, 3} 121.70 98.27 −23.43
9 {2, 4} 56.70 50.22 −6.48
10 {3, 4} 252.68 209.93 −42.75
11 {1, 2, 3} 270.45 259.48 −10.97
12 {1, 2, 4} 211.28 202.43 −8.85
13 {1, 3, 4} 407.32 371.14 −36.18
14 {2, 3, 4} 188.49 179.21 −9.28
15 {1, 2, 3, 4} 340.42 340.42 0
that datacenter 2 behaves as a producer since its individual
bidding cost is negative. In order to quantify the aggregation
benefits of our proposed method, we define the cost saving
percentage as the ratio of cost saving and individual bidding
cost. The cost saving percentage of each datacenter over 24
hours in a day is given in Fig. 9. It can be observed that our
proposed allocation method can always ensure positive cost
reduction for each datacenter and the cost saving amount of
each datacenter is different, depending on its contribution
to the aggregation benefits.
Table 2 presents the noncooperative and coalitional elec-
tricity cost of each coalition at hour 5. The last column gives
the corresponding excesses e(pi, S) defined in (8). From
row 1 to row 14, the calculated excesses are all negative
which satisfies the condition of subgroup rationality, i.e.,∑
i∈S pii ≤ c(S). The last row indicates that our cost allo-
cation is efficient since
∑
i∈N pii = c(N ). It verifies that our
proposed cost allocation lies in the core of the cooperative
game since both subgroup rationality and efficiency condi-
tions are satisfied.
7.2.3 Impact of Percentile
Now we present how market prices affect the cost saving
and the day-ahead bid of each datacenter when they form
the grand coalition. According to Theorem 1, the optimal
day-ahead bid depends on the quantile function where
the percentile ε∗ =
µ−p −µ
d
p
µ
−
p −µ
+
p
, which is decided by expected
electricity prices µdp, µ
−
p and µ
+
p . In order to obtain dif-
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Fig. 10. Cost saving percentage of each datacenter at hour 5 when the percentile ε∗ is 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75, respectively.
TABLE 3
The percentage of the average cost saving of each datacenter under
different percentiles
ε∗ = 0.25 ε∗ = 0.50 ε∗ = 0.75
Datacenter 1 8.90% 12.60% 14.66%
Datacenter 2 49.13% 31.35% 23.14%
Datacenter 3 10.34% 12.78% 14.82%
Datacenter 4 18.63% 22.45% 25.62%
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Fig. 11. Day-ahead bidding level comparison under percentiles ε∗ from
0 to 1 at hour 5.
ferent percentiles, we fix the expected day-ahead price µdp
and expected positive imbalance price µ+p as constants and
adjust the expected negative imbalance price µ−p to different
values.
Fig. 10 depicts the cost saving percentage of each dat-
acenter at hour 5 when the percentile ε∗ is 0.25, 0.50 and
0.75, respectively. Further, the percentage of the average
cost saving of each datacenter over 24 hours is listed in
Table 3. We can observe that for datacenter 1, 3 and 4, the
percentage of the average cost saving increases when the
percentile ε∗ increases. This is intuitive since we have less
chance to reduce cost through aggregation when the penalty
price is lower. Indeed, when the expected negative penalty
price is the same as the expected day-ahead electricity price,
there is no need for aggregation since one could always
buy any shortfall from the real-time market without penalty.
However for datacenter 2, the percentage of the average cost
saving decreases when the percentile ε∗ increases. From the
net power demand curve of datacenter 2, given the per-
centile ε∗, we can calculate the optimal day-ahead bidding
amount. When ε∗ increases, the optimal bidding amount
changes from negative to positive, and therefore datacenter
2 changes from produce to consumer with decreased cost
saving percentage.
Fig. 11 shows the changes of day-ahead bidding level
of the baseline and the proposed method under different
percentiles at hour 5. It can be observed that under both
cases, the day-ahead bidding level decreases as the per-
centile increases. The reason is that when the percentile
is near 0, datacenters can buy any shortfall in the real-
time market without penalty and therefore tend to bid less.
On the other hand, when the percentile is approaching 1,
datacenters behave more conservatively since the expected
negative imbalance price is much higher than the expected
day-ahead price. In order to avoid high penalty for energy
shortfall, they tend to bid more power amount to lower the
possible mismatch between committed power supply in the
day-ahead market and realized net power demand in the
real-time market. Moreover, the change rate of bidding level
of our proposed method with respect to the percentile is
smaller than that of the baseline. This is due to the fact
that the proposed method has a smaller net power demand
uncertainty and therefore is less sensitive to the percentile.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a new approach to min-
imize the electricity cost for datacenters participating in
the wholesale electricity market. The electricity cost can
be effectively reduced by bidding in the day-ahead market
collectively since aggregation can reduce the uncertainty of
net power demand. We model this aggregation process as a
cooperative game and present a cost allocation mechanism
based on the marginal contribution of each datacenter to the
total expected cost to distribute the optimal expected cost to
each datacenter within the grand coalition. Moveover, we
have discussed how to share the coalitional cost after the
realizations of net power demand and market prices. Our
proposed proportional cost allocation method can ensure
the stability of our cooperative bidding game after realiza-
tions in the long run. Finally, simulations based on real-
world traces verify the effectiveness of our proposed cost
saving method.
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